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Abstract 
According to the literature on lobbying, actors gain access to European policy-
making in return for information and expertise. It is often assumed that territorial 
actors will be in a position to provide such information by virtue of being the 
implementing authorities. By contrast, this article argues that there is a need to 
examine further to what extent regions are able to use channels of interest 
representation and to supply information, what kind of channels they use and how 
they frame their message. For this purpose, it examines the strategies of seven 
legislative regions in two concrete policy cases. In particular, it argues that the seven 
regions rely predominantly on mediated channels of interest representation as their 
capacity and willingness to use unmediated channels of interest representation is 
limited. Secondly, it argues that regions tend to use technical language over 
politicized language in lobbying to avoid overt conflict, especially with national 
governments or other regions from the member state, but that their ability to produce 
extensive (technical) expertise is also very limited.  
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Since the 1980s, regional governments have become increasingly aware of the 
impact of European integration and more assertive in European Union (EU) policy-
making. On the one hand, this is reflected in the evolution of domestic procedures for 
coordination in EU affairs in the case of federal and strongly regionalized states. On 
the other, their level of activism in Brussels – the location of the main EU institution 
(the European Commission (hereafter ‘the Commission’, the European Parliament, 
hereafter ‘the Parliament’, the Council of Ministers and the European Council) – has 
increased. i  After the establishment of the first Brussels offices of regions in the 
1980s, the number of sub-national representations has grown to 219 
(GREENWOOD, 2011, p. 439). Two thirds of those represent individual sub-
national governments (MARKS et al., 2002). In addition, regional lobbying has led 
to the establishment of new forms of involvement such as the consultative 
Committee of the Regions and greater access to the Council of Minister. The 
Commission’s 2001 White Paper on Governance and the increased use of 
consultations has also opened opportunities for territorial interest representation 
(KNODT et al., 2011, p. 350).  
The strong presence of regions in Brussels raises a number of questions as to the 
strategies of interest representation of these regions. On the one hand, regional 
governments tend to define themselves as institutions of representative democracy 
that represent legitimate general interests rather than as ‘lobbyists’, which is a term 
that can evoke narrower economic or societal interests. On the other hand, they ‘can 
and do become ‘lobbyists’ for their own distinct interests as public authorities’, 
especially where the costs of implementation or financial benefits are at stake 
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(GREENWOOD, 2011, p. 438). Thus, regional governments benefit from an 
informational asymmetry on the European level where understaffed decision-makers 
– especially in the Commission and European Parliament – are willing to grant 
access to policy-making in return for information (CHALMERS, 2013, p. 39; 
QUITTKAT and KOTZIAN, 2011, p. 403). The challenge for regional authorities is 
to establish their credibility and gain attention (PRINCEN 2011, p. 931). 
According to the idea that there is a situation of information asymmetry in the 
European Union, European policy-makers, and especially the Commission, need 
expertise and political support for policy-formulation. However, demand for 
information and the willingness and ability to supply information are two different 
issues (KNODT et al., 2011, p. 355; CHALMERS, 2013, p. 40). Not all regional 
governments may have the same capacity to use the same range of channels and 
provide the same types of information (GREENWOOD, 2011, p. 440). Thus, in order 
to shed light on the capacity of regions to engage in EU policy-making, this article 
will investigate two questions: The first is about the tactics of regions and the second 
about the type of information that is supplied. Firstly, to what extent do regions use 
instruments of access that are unmediated by national governments, such as 
interregional networks, direct contacts with the European institutions and the 
organization of events (cf. MARKS, 1993; JEFFERY, 2000), as compared to access 
mediated by national governments? Secondly, to what extent do regional 
governments use their position as implementers of European policies to provide 
technical information, and to what extent do they use their position as elected 
institutions to make openly politicised claims (cf. CHALMERS, 2013)? The focus 
lies thus not so much on the causes of the strategies (cf. HÖGENAUER, 2013), but 
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on the nature of the strategies of interest representation, i.e. the tools and arguments 
that regions make use of. 
In order to answer these questions, the article will focus on seven legislative regions, 
Scotland, Bavaria, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Flanders, Wallonia, Vorarlberg 
and Carinthia, i.e. cases from the strongest group of regions from a constitutional 
perspective. These regions may not be representative of the whole spectrum of 
regions, but they represent a ‘best case’ scenario for a study focusing on the capacity 
of regions to become active in EU policy-making. They have implementation and 
legislative competences in the policy area under investigation and have thus a high 
degree of legitimacy, an experienced administration, the grass-root knowledge that 
the Commission needs and a motivation to mobilize (e.g. to preserve their 
competences). In general, these regions should thus be able to develop and 
implement particularly ambitious and resource-intensive strategies especially 
compared weaker regions. These cases thus allow us to see how far regional interest 
representation can go. At the same time, they represent different levels of economic 
prosperity and population size, which creates variation in their level of resources and 
their precise capacity to mobilize (cf. HÖGENAUER, 2013).  
The policy cases are two environmental Directives (the Bathing Water and the Flood 
Risk Management Directive), which are regulatory policies and thus representative 
of the bulk of EU policy-making. The Bathing Water Directive provides a new 
framework for assessing the quality of water in lakes and at the coast in relation to 
health risks for bathers. The Flood Risk Management Directive provides the first 
European-wide regulation of flood risk management strategies including flood maps, 
plans for responses to flooding and the planning of flood barriers or flood plains.ii  
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All seven regions were affected by the policy problem (salience). In the case of the 
Flood Risk Management Directive, all regions were affected by severe flooding in 
the years preceding the directive and suffered from extensive material damage and – 
in extreme cases – human losses. In the case of the Bathing Water Directive, all 
seven regions contain a substantial number of official bathing waters and thus had to 
consider the implementation costs of a stricter policy. Most of the regions also had to 
take into account the potential negative impact on public opinion of bathing waters 
suddenly being classified as unhealthy, whereas Carinthia with its exceptionally good 
water quality saw an opportunity to tighten the competition.  
In addition, all seven regions have implementation competences in the policy areas, 
and all regions except for the Austrian Länder have also legislative competences. The 
Bathing Water Directive was replacing an existing outdated Directive, but the Flood 
Risk Management Directive represented a first incursion of the EU into that policy 
area. 
Finally, all seven regions were active in the domestic coordination of the national 
position on these policy cases (mediated access), which further demonstrates that all 
of the regions are, in principle, interested in influencing the policy outcome. This 
makes the policies also good cases to study the willingness and ability of regions to 
mobilize in Brussels.  
From a methodological point of view, the case studies are reconstructed from 
qualitative data – 36 interviews with officials from all seven regions, their Brussels 
offices, national ministries and European institutions and ten shorter oral or written 
exchanges with officials. A full list of interviews is included in the appendix. In 
addition, speeches, newsletters, press releases and position papers were analyzed 
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where those were available. This methodology supports the aim of the article to 
analyze the nature of the strategies of interest representation of the regions, as it 
provides insights not only into the channels that were used, but also into how those 
channels were used across the whole policy cycle from drafting to implementation 
(i.e. variation across policy stages) and how the regions framed their message (i.e. 
technocratic or politicized). 
In terms of structure, the article will first discuss the literature on territorial interest 
representation and, in particular, the channels of mediated and unmediated access 
available to the regions in general. The second section will then analyse the findings 
on the strategies of the regions in the concrete policy cases and analyse them along 
the lines of the core questions: the extent of the strategies, the choice of tactics 
(mediated/unmediated) and the politicization of the message. The third section will 
discuss the implications of these findings for a number of discussions in the literature 
on multi-level governance and territorial interest representation. Finally, it will 
conclude by summarizing the core argument that the capacity of regions to engage in 
extensive lobbying strategies on the European level and to supply certain kinds of 
information is extremely limited. 
 
The Opportunities for Territorial Interest Representation in a multi-level 
European Union 
Multi-level Venue Shopping 
The multi-level governance (MLG) literature argues that the EU is ‘a system of 
continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers – 
supranational, national, regional and local - as the result of a broad process of 
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institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously 
centralised functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the 
local/regional level’ (MARKS, 1993, p. 392). Supranational actors, in particular the 
Commission, are assumed to engage in alliances with the subnational level that allow 
both levels to circumvent central governments and strengthens their position in the 
decision-making process (MARKS et al., 1996; HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001). 
However, with regard to regions, the enthusiasm of the mid-1990s soon ebbed and 
was replaced by the recognition that central governments were still the strongest 
actors and that they may also remain the main point of contact for regions (cf. 
JEFFERY, 2000; HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001). 
The literature on interest organizations and multi-level venue shopping, which also 
draws on a broader application of the MLG literature, asks to what extent the 
reallocation of competences to the European level has led to a reorientation of 
strategies of interest representation to the European level, which actors are the target 
of European strategies and which factors influence such strategies (MARKS et al., 
1996; BEYERS, 2002; BEYERS et al., 2008). Both literatures face the question how 
national access impacts European level strategies: Are actors that have good access 
to national policy-makers more or less likely to mobilize at the European level? 
There is broad agreement in the MLG literature that constitutional strength has a 
positive impact on the likelihood of mobilization of a region (MARKS et al., 1996; 
NIELSEN and SALK, 1998; MARKS et al., 2002; DONAS and BEYERS, 2012). 
Most authors from the literature on multi-level venue-shopping similarly conclude 
that organizations that are strong domestically are also more likely to develop strong 
European strategies, as they tend to have better access to information and possible 
access to European actors via their national networks (BEYERS, 2002; GREER et 
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al., 2008, p. 427; BEYERS and KERREMANS, 2012). By contrast, TATHAM 
(2010) suggests that regions with a greater number of competences are less likely to 
engage in conflictual strategies in Brussels and more likely to cooperate with their 
central governments. The apparent contradiction may be resolved if one takes into 
account that not every instance of unmediated access expresses conflict with the 
national government. With regard to our case study regions, this means that we 
should expect extensive mobilization at the European level, in line with the strong 
domestic position of the regions.  
At the same time, the literature on interest groups also confirms JEFFERY’s claim 
that legislative regions regard domestic channels as their primary contact point 
(2000): BEYERS and KERREMANS show that the interest groups of four member 
states establish first their national network, before creating a European level strategy 
(2012, pp. 283-4). 
The literature on lobbying also offers further distinctions between strategies, in 
particular outsider and insider tactics. Outside tactics (or ‘seeking voice’) are 
oriented towards the public and include the organization of independent meetings or 
of media strategies, compared to insider tactics (‘seeking access’) oriented at the 
policy-making elites, such as participation in consultations, expert meetings and the 
use of emails and phone calls to European actors (cf. BEYERS, 2004; 2008, p. 
1189). According to WOLL, EU lobbying mostly involves insider tactics, especially 
consultation, and a cautious and constructive approach (2006, p. 463). However, 
whether an interest group focuses more on one or the other strategy depends to some 
extent on the organization and resources of the group, e.g. whether they can offer 
expertise or mobilize people. CHALMERS (2013, pp. 43, 52-4) suggests that the use 
of multiple tactics works best, as it demonstrates commitment to a position. Most 
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groups do indeed use both strategies simultaneously, but diffuse interests, tend to use 
outside tactics more and tend to get more access to the EP than to the Commission, 
whereas specific interests associated with insider tactics tend to have more access to 
the Commission (BOUWEN, 2004; EISING, 2007; DÜR and MATEO, 2013; 
CHALMERS, 2013: 49).  
The case study regions could in principle use both strategies: As legislative regions 
with competences in the policy area they possess a high degree of legitimacy that 
could support a strategy based on politicized claims and ‘voice’. At the same time, as 
implementing authorities, they possess expertise that could support insider tactics. It 
This can again be linked to TATHAMS’s finding that constitutionally strong regions 
are less likely to engage in conflictual strategies in Brussels (2010). Regions can in 
principle become active in Brussels even in the absence of conflict within the 
member state. Even if there is conflict, they might not choose an openly conflictual 
strategy, but rather argue on the technical level. At the same time, regions may face a 
trade off between the two tactics as both tactics represent resource-challenges: the 
organization of an outsider strategy with independent events requires organizational 
resources, where as an effective insider strategy requires expertise. 
Thus, both literatures raise questions as to the extent to which legislative regions 
really use Brussels strategies and, in particular, unmediated access to the European 
level. In addition, in order to assess to what extent the strategies of the regions are 
conflictual, it is important to also analyze how the message is framed and whether 
conflict is emphasized or deemphasized by a certain region.  
While the primary concern of the article is to analyse the nature of the strategies of 
interest representation, differences in strategy are to be expected and need to be 
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explained. Much of the multi-level governance literature (esp. by Marks and 
Hooghe) relies on implicit or explicit rationalist assumptions, for example about how 
regions reorient their strategies after governments transfer competences to the 
European level, or on the reasons why governments transfer competences. Similarly, 
rationalist assumptions influence part of the Europeanization literature, in the form of 
the argument that ‘misfit’ between the European policies and the national policies 
generates costs and hence pressures for adaptation (cf. BACHE, 2008, HERITIER, 
1996). This article also follows the rational choice institutionalist assumptions that 
actors will weigh the costs and benefits of the issue at stake and of the available 
courses of action within a given institutional framework (cf. HALL and TAYLOR, 
1996; PETERS, 2000). With regard to the matter at hand, two hypotheses can be 
derived.  
Firstly, among the available options, regions will choose the least costly strategy to 
achieve their goals. As argued below, this will normally be mediated access where 
the national government takes the lead in the representation of a joint interest. 
Unmediated access, and even more so an outside tactic oriented towards the public, 
will mostly be used when disagreements with the national government make 
mediated access less effective (cf. HÖGENAUER, 2013). Secondly, regional 
governments will only opt for outside tactics in case their primary concerns are 
political rather than technical in nature. As outside tactics are resource-intensive, it 
is to be expected that they will only be used for issues that are seen to be particularly 
salient. In addition, outside tactics that rely on a strong political message and 
unmediated access tend to place the position of an individual region (or group of 
regions) above the interest of the state as a whole, and thus increase the likelihood of 
friction (or open conflict) with the national government. 
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At first glance, the regulatory nature of the directives might suggest that the 
arguments at stake in the two policy cases are primarily technical: about definitions 
of water quality, the type of flood risk management required etc. In line with the 
rationalist assumptions, these arguments would favour an insider strategy that 
focuses on information exchange and persuasion, rather than a resource-intensive 
outsider strategy focusing on voice. The media and public would probably show 
limited interest in complex scientific arguments. However, this assessment neglects 
underlying potential for political conflict.  In both cases, the precise technical 
agreements could result in considerable implementation costs for the regions and 
could thus raise the question of proportionality and what a policy goal is ‘worth’. In 
addition, the Flood Risk Management Directive is a European intervention in a 
policy area hitherto regulated on the regional (and in Austria national) level. It thus 
limits the legislative margin of manoeuvre of the regions and raises the question of 
subsidiarity. In line with the hypotheses, we would thus expect outsider strategies to 
be more likely to occur on the Floor Risk Management Directive than on the Bathing 
Water Directive, especially in conjunction with political arguments about 
subsidiarity. As the issues at stake can thus be defined in different ways, the 
preferences of each region have been defined subjectively, as expressed in interviews 
and documents. 
Of course, in order to understand the strategies of regions on the European level, one 
first needs to understand the options available to regions. The next two sections will 
therefore briefly discuss the channels of mediated and unmediated access that are 
available to the case study regions. Mediated channels of interest representation are 
all those that depend upon coordination with and approval of the central government. 
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Unmediated channels of interest representation comprise any type of interest 
representation that does not require coordination with the central government.  
 
Unmediated Channels for Interest Representation 
The most ‘institutionalised’ channel for subnational authorities is the Committee of 
Regions (CoR), an advisory organ consisting of representatives of the regional and 
local level. Its greatest strength is that the Commission is obliged to consult it on a 
wide range of issues (Art. 265 EC). Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the refocusing of its 
political strategy on policy areas where consultation is mandatory and on the defence 
of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is seen to have increased its 
effectiveness (DOMORENOK, 2009, p. 160). The CoR is also seen as providing a 
setting for coalition-building and the debate of subnational issues at the European 
level (MÜLLER-GRAFF, 2005, p. 109). However, the CoR only confers collective 
influence upon its members, and a region therefore needs to engineer a strong 
majority position before the CoR becomes an effective tool. This is complicated by 
the diverse membership where strong legislative regions are outnumbered by 
representatives from local authorities or weak regions (ibid. p. 110).  
Regional governments can also target MEPs as a relatively low-cost channel. The 
most common practice is to contact the MEPs from the region. If a region has access 
to the chair or rapporteur of a relevant committee, it can influence the direction of 
debates in the European Parliament. More generally, the MEPs may be able to 
introduce amendments that reflect the region’s concerns. At the lowest level, the 
region may just get its own MEPs to cast the “right” vote (cf. TATHAM, 2008, pp. 
504-6; KNODT et al., 2009, p. 128). However, regions – and especially smaller 
regions - may only have a small number of MEPs (TATHAM, 2008, p. 504). Those 
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MEPs may not even sit in the right committees. In addition, politicians are subject to 
a variety of pressures, especially rapporteurs, shadow rapporteurs and Committee 
chairmen, who can receive conflicting position papers from hundreds of actors 
(Interviews 7, 24).  
Thirdly, regions can also try to address the Commission directly, either on the 
political level or on the level of administrators, for example through participation in 
consultations and expert meetings, the organization of lobbying events or 
participation in events organized by other actors. The regional information offices 
would generally be in charge of facilitating these contacts and events (MOORE, 
2006). There is however considerable variation in the importance that different types 
of regions attach to influencing policies. According to MARKS et al., whether or not 
a regional office seeks political influence depends on its constitutional strength and 
its resources (which depend – again – on the constitutional strength of the region) 
(2002, p. 15). In addition, the format of the offices varies. While the German and 
Austrian offices are independent from the permanent representations of their country 
and thus similar to lobbying offices, the Belgian offices are in the same building as 
the permanent representation, but separate in terms of budgets and staff 
(SWENDEN, 2009). In the British case, the devolved offices have privileged access 
to information through the UK permanent representation, but are in return expected 
to adopt a more moderate stance and to deemphasize conflict with the UK 
government (BULMER et al., 2006; TATHAM, 2008, p. 507).  
Since the 1980s, a variety of more or less specialised networks and associations have 
been created. Their basis can be very broad, as in the case of the Assembly of 
European Regions or the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe, 
defined by competences, as in the case of the Conference of European Regions with 
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Legislative Power (REGLEG), or defined by common features, as in the case of the 
Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions. However, these associations only 
represent the more institutionalised end of regional cooperation. In addition, there are 
a variety of informal working groups of regions of the same states (such as the 
thematic working groups of the regional offices of the German Länder) and different 
states. The question is to what extent these networks generate benefits (KEATING, 
1998, p. 178). Undoubtedly, the collective position of several regions holds more 
weight with the European Commission than the individual position of one single 
region (TATHAM, 2008, pp. 508-9; KNODT, 2011, pp. 427-428). Yet, in the 
Scottish context, a leaked draft report from Michael Aron, the then Head of the 
Scottish Executive European Office, to the Scottish First Minister questioned the 
effectiveness of both formal partnership agreements with other regions and networks 
(ARON, 2006, pp. 7, 11-12, 16). Ultimately, the extent to which regions use 




The participation of regional representatives in the Council of Ministers theoretically 
provides regions with the most formal and substantial means to influence EU policy-
making. However, as article 203 of the Treaty of Maastricht did not specify the 
precise modalities of this involvement, different national practices evolved (cf. 
KEATING and HOOGHE, 2006, pp. 274-5). A major limitation to the effectiveness 
of regional representation in the Council is that whoever sits in the Council has to be 
able ‘to commit the government of that member state’ (Art. 203 TEC, 
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KOVZIRIDZE, 2002, pp. 131, 136). The position presented consequently has to be 
the national, not the regional one (HÖGENAUER, 2008).  
The Belgian regions have the most extensive representation rights in the Council of 
Ministers, in line with the Belgian constitutional principle (art. 167) that each part of 
the state has foreign policy competences in the policy areas that fall under its 
domestic competences (HOGWOOD et al., 2003, p. 3).  When an issue falls under 
the sole federal responsibility, federal ministers sit in the Council. In case of 
exclusive regional competences, regional ministers sit in the Council. When 
predominantly central competences are concerned, a national minister is being 
assisted by a regional representative and finally, for predominantly regional matters, 
a regional minister is assisted by a representative of the national level 
(KERREMANS and BEYERS, 1997).  Equality between regions is ensured through 
a rotation system. In practice, though, ministers of all levels are reluctant to attend in 
the role of assessors and there are often several regional officials present at all levels 
of Council meetings to facilitate coordination (KOVZIRIDZE, 2002, p. 149). 
Separate arrangements apply for fisheries and agriculture. 
In the German case the federal government is in a superior position (KOVZIRIDZE, 
2002, p. 150). Until 2006, in areas where Länder participated in the domestic 
legislative process via the Bundesrat, a Länder representative was included in the 
German delegation if the Länder made a request and if it was possible for the central 
government to do so (BLArt. 23(6); LC §6(1)). When the exclusive competences of 
the Länder were concerned, a Länder representative was nominated by the Bundesrat 
and the Länder could send a minister to the Council and even represent Germany but 
were not obliged to do so. In practice, the Länder rarely claimed the right to 
represent Germany in the Council (JEFFERY, 2007). In 2006, the “Federalism I” 
16 
 
reform limited the policy areas in which Länder ministers can represent Germany in 
the Council to education, culture and broadcasting. However, the Länder now lead 
the German delegation in these areas (JEFFERY, 2007; CHARDON and EPPLER, 
2009, pp. 29-30). 
For Austria, a Länder-nominated representative can participate in the Council if the 
domestic legislative competences of the Länder are concerned and the national 
government agrees (Art. 23d Federal Constitution).  Thus, the Länder depend on 
empowerment from the national government even in areas where they are affected 
(KOVZIRIDZE, 2002, pp. 151-2; BUßJÄGER and DJANANI, 2009, p. 64). In 
addition, the Liaison Office of the Länder, an administrative structure for the 
purpose of horizontal and vertical coordination, has one representative in the 
Austrian Permanent Representation with privileged access to information and 
Council meetings (PAHL, 2004, p. 113). 
The situation in the UK is somewhat similar to the Austrian case, in that the decision 
on whether or not to include a Scottish minister or expert in the UK delegation rests 
with the UK lead. Once they are part of the delegation Scottish ministers and 
officials require the permission of the UK lead before they can take the floor 
(SWENDEN, 2009). 
 
The European Strategies of the Regions on Bathing Water and Flood Risk 
Management 
Overall, as legislative regions, all of the regions were either present or represented on 
the European level in some form. At the same time, there were noticeable differences 
in the extent and form of European level activity between regions including both 
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types of channels (mediated/unmediated) and the form of the message 
(technical/political) (cf. Table 1). 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Extensive Mediated Access to the European Institutions 
The extensive use of mediated access confirms JEFFERY’s argument about the 
importance of domestic channels (2000). All seven regions were individually or 
collectively represented in Commission working groups and expert meetings at the 
drafting stage of both Directives, with the exception of the Austrian Länder and the 
Flood Risk Management Directive.  
In the case of the German and Austrian Länder and Scotland, the national expert 
would take the lead and regional experts could only speak on rare occasions. The 
German Länder were collectively represented through the representatives of the 
Bundesrat (Interview 8, 18, 29). Similarly, Länder experts attended the stakeholder 
meetings for the Flood Risk Management Directive (Interview 27). The Austrian 
Länder were also represented through their common representative for bathing water, 
but they were not involved in preparatory meetings on the Flood Risk Management 
Directive (Interviews 11, 22). Scotland was well represented in the Commission 
stakeholder meetings and expert groups preparing the proposal for the Bathing Water 
Directive, as they had commissioned part of the research that informed the UK 
position (and the final Directive) (Interviews 29, 32, 33). Scotland’s participation in 
the negotiations of the Flood Risk Management Directive was less active, due to a 
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late surge in interest. Not all opportunities for participation in the UK delegation 
were used (Interviews 34, 36).  
In line with the principle of “in foro interno, in foro externo”, the Belgian regions 
played a greater role in their national delegation to European level meetings than the 
other regions. At the drafting stage, the ‘pilot’, the regional official in charge of 
coordinating the Belgian position on matters of exclusive regional competence, 
represented Belgium in the Commission stakeholder meetings (Oral communication 
2; Interview 24). In the case of the Flood Risk Management Directive, there were 
exceptionally two pilots – from Flanders and Wallonia - who would both attend the 
meetings (Interview 27). In the case of the Bathing Water Directive, both the Flemish 
pilot and the Walloon expert would participate.  
At the decision-making stage, all of the regions were represented on some level in 
the Council, with the exception of Austria and the Bathing Water Directive. For 
Germany, the representatives of the Bundesrat participated in meetings of the 
Council working groups during the negotiations. However, his role was consultative 
as only the national expert or permanent representative can take the floor (Interview 
8, 18, 17, 27). In the case of Austria, the common representatives from Styria and 
Carinthia could represent the Länder in Council working group meetings on flood 
risk management (Interviews 12, 13). In addition, the Austrian Länder have a 
representative of their Liaison Office in Brussels, who has access as an observer to 
Council meetings and meetings of the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER), that prepares the agenda and negotiations in the Council of Ministers. 
He also attended Council meetings on the two Directives (Interview 26). In the case 
of the UK, the Scottish expert or somebody from the Scottish Representation would 
observe Council working group meetings a few times (Interview 32, 33, 34). Scottish 
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ministers were also present at several Council meetings where the Flood Risk 
Management Directive was discussed 
(www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/International-Relations/Europe/Scotland-
in-Brussels/Councils/EUCouncilsArchive). Finally, the regional ministers 
represented Belgium in the Council at the level of ministers. At the lower levels of 
the Council, the Permanent Representation would take the lead, but the regional 
experts and regional attachés to the permanent representation were present as 
advisors at the level of the working groups, and the regional attachés to the 
Permanent Representation often attended COREPER as observers (Interviews 20, 21, 
23, 24, 25).  
Finally, all regions were represented in Commission committees and expert groups at 
the implementation stage. In general, the opportunities for regional experts to take 
the floor were perceived to be much greater, so that regions that were directly 
represented could to some extent promote their approaches. Those regions are of 
course Scotland, Flanders and Wallonia, but regional experts from Bavaria and 
Mecklenburg West-Pomerania also attended specific workshops (Interviews 2, 7, 13, 
17, 20, 21, 25, 27). Scotland also organised a workshop on catchments and flood 
management in October 2009 (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WGF, 2009; 
Interviews 27, 36). Wallonia also organized a workshop on bathing water profiles in 
Namur during the transposition phase (Interview 21).  
Variation between states was thus fairly limited, and mostly concerned the question 
of individual or collective representation. In the case of the UK and Belgium, which 
have few (legislative) regions, the regions have direct access to the various European 
fora. In the case of Germany and Austria, regions were represented as a collective 
through a common representative (Austria) or representative of the Bundesrat 
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(Germany). This does have some impact on the ability of regions to represent their 
interests. Scottish, Flemish and Walloon officials were sometimes able to voice their 
own concerns at the level of civil servants, despite the expectation that countries 
speak with one voice in European institutions. By contrast, the German and Austrian 
Länder were bound by a collective regional position. At the same time, Scottish 
officials felt less secure in their representation rights than the officials of the other 
three member states, because they were aware that their participation rights depended 
on the goodwill of the UK government (Interview 32). 
 
Limited Unmediated Access to the European Level 
As the overview in Table 1 indicates, the use of unmediated strategies of interest 
representation was limited. Neither of the Austrian regions made any attempt to gain 
unmediated access to the European level. The same is true for the German Länder 
and the Bathing Water Directive and Scotland and the Flood Risk Management 
Directive. Scotland participated in a seminar in the EP that had been organised by the 
UK, but otherwise only discussed the Directive with other regions at the margins of 
the official meetings in Brussels (Interviews 34, 36). In general, the reliance on 
mediated access can be explained by the absence of conflict between the national and 
regional goverments in these cases: the cheapest available means to achieve one’s 
goals was to support the national government in its efforts to represent the common 
interests (cf. HÖGENAUER, 2013). 
Where limited unmediated access was established, the EP was the main target. 
Wallonia had contact with its MEPs for both Directives and informed them of the 
position and problems of the region (Oral communication 2; Interview 21). Flanders 
21 
 
only briefed one Dutch MEP on the Flood Risk Management Directive (Interview 
20). For the Bathing Water Directive, the Flemish pilot had one discussion with the 
Dutch rapporteur, whom he visited once with the permanent representative and the 
Walloon and Flemish attachés. He also used the Commission committees to establish 
bilateral contact with the Commission desk officers (Interview 25). 
There are only two cases of an extensive strategy of unmediated access. Scotland 
developed a complex strategy on bathing water on the basis of a commissioned 
report on the quality of bathing water, i.e. scientific expertise and data. The focus 
was thus very much on technical rather than political arguments and the Scottish 
position was presented in technical terms throughout the entire negotiation. This is 
also one of the few cases where networks played a role. In particular, Scottish 
officials used the European Federation of National Associations of Water and Waste 
Water Services – EUREAU – to promote shared concerns about the sources of 
pollution beyond sewage. The involvement in stakeholder networks allowed 
Scotland to get hold of documents at an early stage and provided it with a platform 
where it could promote its perspective. Thus, the Scottish expert was invited by 
EUREAU to a workshop in Barcelona and later by EUREAU and the UK Water 
industry to speak at a Commission workshop in Vienna. In addition, the Committee 
of Regions was briefed through the Scottish Representation (Interviews 31, 32). 
Contact to key MEPs also played an important part in the Scottish strategy. In 
particular, with the help of the Scottish Representation, the Scottish experts had 
contact with Catherine Stihler, who helped them to promote the Scottish perspective 
by briefing other Scottish and UK MEPs and establishing contact to Martin Schulz, 
the leader of the then Party of European Socialists. In addition, before the first 
reading, Catherine Stihler took the Scottish expert to an EP workshop in Strasburg as 
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an advisor, where he got the chance to talk to the relevant desk officer of the 
Commission (Interview 31).  
Finally, the Commission attended a Scottish bathing water event in Dundee that 
Scotland successfully used to promote a signalling system for bad bathing water as 
best practice (Interviews 31, 32, 33). Overall, while the Scottish strategy involved 
unmediated access and was quite extensive, it remained largely an insider strategy 
that relied on scientific arguments about the causes of pollution and possible 
solutions. The strategy was motivated by initial disagreement with the UK 
government, but as the disagreement was about technical matters, Scotland generally 
avoided emphasizing the conflict in public. 
The second case of an extensive lobbying strategy is the Bavarian strategy on Flood 
Risk Management. As in the Scottish case, it was at least in part motived by 
disagreement with the German government, which reduced the usefulness of the less 
costly mediated channels. Part of this activity was based on a decision of the German 
Länder to contact the MEPs to influence the EP’s position in the second reading 
(Interviews 6, 29). As a result, both Bavaria and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 
briefed their MEPs on specific amendments (MECKLENBURG-WEST 
POMERANIA 2007; Interviews 1, 3, 6, 17; VERTRETUNG DES FREISTATES 
BAYERN BEI DER EU, Europabericht No. 12/2006). In addition, Bavaria, 
resolutely opposed to the Directive, used administrators and politicians to support a 
strategy that emphasised both technical aspects (costs, duplication risks) and political 
aspects (subsidiarity, regional competences) and that could thus be used to raise the 
question of legitimacy and address a wider public. 
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On the administrative level, the Bavaria replied to the Commission consultation in 
mid-2005 (BAYERISCHES STAATSMINISTERIUM FÜR UMWELT, 
GESUNDHEIT UND VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ, 2005). In addition, it took the 
unusual step of drawing up a cost estimate of the implementation of the Directive 
and sending this to the Commission. Despite the fact that Bavaria with its 12 million 
inhabitants is larger than a number of member states and has considerable 
administrative capacity in EU affairs, the costs of creating such a document were so 
high that it was the first time ever that Bavaria produced such a document and so far 
also the last time. In general, this sort of initiative is seen as highly exceptional even 
amongst large legislative regions as the costs of creating such a document in terms of 
human resources are regarded as being prohibitively high (Interview 1).  
On the political level, three Bavarian Ministers mobilised to defend Bavaria’s 
position. On 20 March 2006, the Minister of the Environment, Health and Consumer 
Protection, Dr. Werner Schnappauf appeared at an open hearing in the European 
Parliament in Brussels (SCHNAPPAUF, EP hearing, 20/03/2006). On 21 March 
2006, the Bavarian cabinet met, for the first time ever, in the Bavarian office in 
Brussels to discuss important European topics, including the Flood Risk 
Management Directive. The Bavarian troika of Minister President Edmund Stoiber, 
the Minister of Environmental Affairs Dr. Werner Schnappauf and Minister of 
European Affairs Emilia Müller used this occasion to meet Commission President 
Barroso to discuss their objections to the Directive and to publicise their opposition 
at home in a press release which also renewed calls for the federal government to 
vote against it (BAYERISCHE STAATSKANZLEI, 9/03/2006). Dr. Werner 
Schnappauf attacked the proposal again in a discussion forum on flood risk 
management organised on 21 June 2006 in the Bavarian office in Brussels 
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(VERTRETUNG DES FREISTAATES BAYERN BEI DER EU, Europabericht No. 
12/2006; Interview 3). Finally, Minister President Stoiber used an EU summit on 
subsidiarity in April 2006 to emphasise once again Bavarian opposition to the Flood 
Risk Management Directive (BAYERISCHE STAATSKANZLEI, 19/04/2006). 
Overall, the use of unmediated access was thus fairly limited when one considers that 
the seven regions are among the strongest in Europe and had all mobilized 
extensively domestically. Given the high level of interest and the comparatively great 
capacity, one could have expected a much higher level of activism in Brussels. 
Instead, only one region took part in the Commission online consultation. Only two 
out of fourteen cases involved the development of an extensive lobbying strategy 
consisting of several actions. Only two regions used networks either to present a 
common concern or as a platform to present individual concerns. The only channel 
that was used frequently was the briefing of the regions’ MEPs. This tactic was used 
seven times, i.e. in half of the cases.  
 
A Preference for Expertise 
The fourteen cases show that there is not just a preference for technical expertise on 
the demand side, but also on the supply side. In thirteen cases, information was 
nearly exclusively couched in technical language and focused on feasibility, 
implementation problems and best practice. The Scottish strategy on bathing water 
illustrates this well. Scotland had a poor record on bathing water quality, so it used 
scientific studies that it commissioned to demonstrate that some regions may not be 
able to improve bathing water significantly, as the problems are not just related to 
sewage. It then used its signaling system to demonstrate that it is possible to prevent 
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people from bathing when the quality of water deteriorates due to weather 
conditions. As a result, the Commission was willing to adapt certain aspects of the 
Directive to take into account the scientific report and the technological 
opportunities. Similarly, in addition to the political objections, the Bavarian cost 
estimate helped to illustrate the point that the Flood Risk Management Directive was 
too ambitious in its original form. 
However, the cases also illustrate potential problems in the supply of expertise. 
While regions can generally provide some expertise on implementation, a more 
systematic presentation of the challenges requires a high level of motivation and 
expertise. Those examples of expertise that stood out and were remembered by the 
Commission are not just ordinary grass-root expertise. Both the Scottish scientific 
report and the Bavarian cost estimate required a substantial investment in the 
production of data. Scotland outsourced the effort and thus had to pay for it, whereas 
Bavaria produced its own data and found the cost in terms of human resources 
prohibitive. Thus, even the biggest legislative regions in Europe produce this kind of 
data only on rare occasions. These investments are very much reserved to high 
priority dossiers. Scotland struggled with the implementation of the old Bathing 
Water Directive and feared that the new one would be even stricter, whereas Bavaria 
anticipated the high costs of a European regulation of Flood Risk Management. 
Overtly politicized arguments were only used in one case out of fourteen, and even 
then only as one element of the strategy. It is mostly in the Bavarian press releases 
and the speeches by Bavarian Ministers that political concepts such as subsidiarity 
were evoked. Thus, in 2006, Bavarian Minister-President Stoiber used the Flood 
Risk Management Directive was then used as an example of a field where the EU 
tried to legislate, despite being perceived as having no competences in the area. He 
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thus opposed the Directive on principle (BAYERISCHE STAATSKANZLEI, 
19/04/2006).  
 
How Important is By Passing? 
Overall, the case studies thus allow us to move beyond the somewhat simplistic 
question in the MLG debate if regions can bypass national governments, and to 
instead discuss more to what extent they can and do bypass. How common is it for a 
region to actually use networks, conferences, its regional offices etc. to establish 
direct access to European actors? What is the nature of those relationships?  
The Importance of Mediated Access to the European Level  
In purely quantitative terms, the regions did not establish unmediated access to a 
European actor in 50 percent of the cases and only established extensive unmediated 
interaction with European actors in two out of fourteen cases. These cases do, of 
course, only represent a small fraction of European policy-making. However, we are 
looking at strong legislative regions, hard law that affects regional competences, 
policy problems that affect the regions and implementation that involves costs that 
fall directly on the regions. The cases are thus ‘good’ cases where one could expect 
to observe multi-level interactions.  
This conclusion that strategies of unmediated access are limited is supported by the 
views that regional officials expressed about regional engagement in European 
policy-making. There was almost unanimous agreement on the importance of 
working through the central government and the national delegation. In fact, it 
appears that the national route is indeed the “default” route, in that regions always 
attach great importance to the negotiation of the national position and their 
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representation in European policy-making through the national delegation (cf. 
JEFFERY, 2000). European level strategies, by contrast, are something that is used 
for special cases, especially when extensive conflict with the national government 
occurs (cf. HÖGENAUER, 2013; Interviews 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 18, 22, 24; Written 
Communication 3).  
 
The Resource Limits of Unmediated Actions at the European Level 
Interviewees from smaller regions in particular were aware of the extent to which 
long-term investments related to the Brussels offices affect a regions general ability 
to act. On the one hand, some of the small regions feel that they cannot afford a 
Brussels office with adequate levels of staff and decide not to have a Brussels office, 
like Vorarlberg. Regions like Vorarlberg end up with a limited margin of manoeuvre 
as it is difficult to establish, maintain or expand a Brussels network in the absence of 
a presence in Brussels (Interview 10). 
However, even if smaller Länder opt for their own Brussels office, the challenges are 
high. Thus, in the Austrian context, BUßJÄGER and DJANANI argue that ‘the 
offices experience further limitations to their ‘output’ due to limited budgetary 
resources’ (2009, p. 64). iii  The Carinthian office itself has two policy officers 
(including the Director) who have to do everything from arranging or giving 
presentations for visitor groups, supervising graduate trainees, running promotional 
activities, monitoring CoR proceedings, keeping the region at home informed to 
actual lobbying. As a result, only a handful of issues are followed up, including 
mainly distributive policy areas and a few topical regulatory policies (e.g. related to 
energy policy) (Interview 28). 
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Even medium-sized offices with seven policy officials in Brussels, like 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, have to be clear on their priorities to be effective, as 
each member of staff covers issues relating to one and a half or two ministries at 
home. The Brussels official covering environmental policy also follows agricultural 
and fishery policy, amongst other things. As Mecklenburg has a long coastline and 
much agriculture, key initiatives in both of these areas tend to take priority over 
environmental matters (Interview 30). It is thus only once we move into larger 
member-state-sized regions that a better ratio of policy areas to staff solves these 
dilemmas. 
At the same time, effective lobbying at the European level requires corresponding 
investments at home (Interview 3, 30). Policy officers in Brussels lack the 
specialization to follow up policies on their own. As a result, a higher level of staff in 
Brussels will only lead to better interest representation if the Land has a 
corresponding capacity to produce expertise (Interview 30).  
The impact of capacity can also be seen in the popularity of MEPs in lobbying 
strategies. Informing the MEPs from the region only requires the region to send an 
email or call, and especially in the case of MEPs from the same party as the 
government, the chances of getting a positive response on at least some points are 
good. No translations are required, the level of expertise that is required is lower than 
for the Commission and the ties are closer than to Commission officials. 
 
The Myth of a Subnational-Supranational Alliance 
The case studies also highlight the problematic treatment of the Commission in the 
literature on multi-level governance. Many authors see it as both a potential ally of 
29 
 
the subnational level against the central government and as an actor who actively 
encourages regions to engage in European policy-making (ANDERSON, 1996; 
ANSELL et al., 1997; TÖMMEL, 1998; BENZ, 1998). However, while the idea of a 
subnational-supranational alliance presupposes the existence of conflict or power 
struggle between the regions and the central government, such conflict cannot be 
taken for granted. In fact, the impression given by recent articles and interviewees 
alike is that regional-central relations are quite consensual in the overwhelming 
number of cases. (cf. TATHAM, 2010; Interview 15). Most of the time regions have 
thus little incentive to escape the clutches of a central state that is quite willing to 
defend their position.  
In particular, policy-specific dynamics play a role in providing a setting for 
constellations of conflict and alliances. While funding opportunities may facilitate 
alliances between the regional and European level, the constellations of conflict and 
alliance are more likely to vary from issue to issue in regulatory policy-making 
depending on how well a proposal fits the regulatory framework of a region. There is 
also a high risk of implementation costs and of European initiatives not fitting 
existing practices in the region. In half the case studies, for instance, there was no 
conflict between the regions and the central government. Instead, they were joined 
either in approval of the Commission’s intentions (e.g. Austria and the Bathing 
Water Directive) or in opposition to the policy (e.g. the UK and the Flood Risk 
Management Directive). European policy-making was thus unlikely to have any 
impact on the power balance between regional and central governments in these 
cases. In those cases where conflict did arise, it took various shapes and forms. In the 
Belgian cases, the regions opted for a common strategy and resolved their 
disagreements at home. However, even if they had engaged in separate lobbying 
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strategies, it would have been a contest of force between regions. The German case 
on flood risk management is also quite interesting in that respect. While neither the 
central government nor the regional governments wanted a highly detailed and costly 
Directive, some non-German interviewees felt that the regions were more opposed 
than the federal government (Interviews 27, 29). 
On the whole, the potential empowering and disempowering effects of Commission 
initiatives on federal or highly decentralised states in regulatory policy areas are 
variable and can lead to different constellations of allies. The same is most likely true 
for non-legislative regions. The only consistent winner in situations of strong 
domestic conflict is arguably the Commission, as it is presented with a choice of 
allies. For the same reason, regional and central state actors usually try to avoid open 
conflict.  
 
Conclusion: The Central State as Gatekeeper? 
On the whole, it appears that for strong legislative regions the “default” approach to 
regional interest representation in European policy-making is to work through the 
national delegations, as this is the most cost-effective means of interest 
representation. Even though in some cases regional representatives mainly acted as 
observers, the mediated presence at the European level is seen as the extension of 
regional influence at the national level. As long as a region is satisfied with the 
national position, it can be a “free rider” and let the central government defend the 
member state’s interest.  
While some authors with a focus on structural funds pointed to the opportunities that 
an alliance between the regions and the Commission presented for regions, 
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regulatory policy-making tends to produce very diverse and fluid constellations of 
interests. Conflict between national governments and legislative regions appears to 
be relatively rare, whereas conflict with the Commission is much for frequent. The 
idea of the alliance against the central state is something of a myth and it could be 
argued that a central-regional alliance is much more common (TATHAM, 2010). 
Genuine unmediated interest representation is less common, and when it occurs it is 
limited to sporadic acts. Most commonly, legislative regions will contact their MEPs 
to influence the position of the Parliament. The European Commission is 
comparatively rarely subject to unmediated lobbying, even though it is the target of 
regional activity through official channels. Neither the Committee of the Regions nor 
networks played a major role in interest representation. Overall, unmediated regional 
activities at the European level are very much supplementary in nature.    
Part of the reasons for the limited unmediated activity are the investments required. 
Especially smaller regions struggle with the costs of unmediated interest 
representation, of having a large Brussels office and sustaining lobbying strategies 
over a longer period of time. But even larger offices do not have the capacity to 
actively engage in all negotiations. Instead, regions generally focus their resources on 
a limited number of high priorities.  
As a result, the central state is still very much at the heart of every-day representation 
in European policy-making and in many cases regional-supranational relations are 
mediated. However, this does not mean that the central government is a gatekeeper 
who controls the interactions between the subnational and the supranational level. 
First of all, in the case of the strongest regions, the Belgian regions, the role of the 
government in domestic coordination has largely receded to that of a mediator in 
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areas of exclusive regional competences (BURSENS and GEERAERTS, 2006; 
HÖGENAUER, 2013). Secondly, to some extent central governments mediate 
because their regions allow them to mediate. While it is true that this regional choice 
is to some extent based on resource-constraints and that the regions would not be 
able to systematically challenge the authority of the central state on a large number 
of policies simultaneously, they can and do challenge its authority on some policies. 
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i
 In EU policy-making, the European Commission has the sole right of initiative in most policy-areas. 
The Council of Ministers (representing the member state governments) and the directly elected 
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European Parliament are co-legislators in most instances of legislative policy-making, including the 
case studies in this article. Once legislation has been adopted, the Commission coordinates and 
supervises its transposition in to national law and its implementation. The Committee of the Regions, 
which is mentioned later in the article, is an official advisory organ of the European Union composed 
of representatives of the regional and local levels of the member states. It has to be consulted by the 
Parliament and the Council on a wide range of policies. 
ii
 Directive 2006/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 February 2006 concerning 
the management of bathing water quality and repealing Directive 76/160/EEC, OJ L 064 , 4/03/2006, 
pp. 37-51. Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 
on the assessment and management of flood risks, OJ L 288, 6/11/2007, pp. 27–34. 
iii
 Translated by the author. 
iv
 ‘Oral communication’ refers to shorter conversations with officials, usually on the phone. 
